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Israel's Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective, 
by Anthony D’Amato,* 10 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 259-264 (Spring, 1996) 
 
Abstract: Solarz argued that Israel's air strike "must be considered an understandable and legitimate act of self-
defense." The point is that if a war exists between Iraq and Israel, Israel's bombing of the Osiraq nuclear reactor is just a 
normal and legitimate part of the general conduct of war. Whether or not Israel or Iraq, or both, regarded themselves as 
being in a state of war, any hostilities between them would amount to separate breaches of the peace in the eyes of the 
international community and would subject either country to forcible intercession by the U.N. Security Council. I 
quoted the U.N. Security Council resolution which "strongly condemned" Israel's air strike. 
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 [pg259]** Imagine if Iraq had been armed with nuclear weapons during the Gulf War. At 
least some of its forty or more Scud missiles that bombarded Israel and Saudi Arabia would then 
have had thermonuclear warheads that would have killed millions of innocent people—vastly more 
than the deaths resulting from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Even if the 
Scuds had been intercepted in flight by the Allied "Patriot" interceptors (and most were not), nu-
clear blasts in the atmosphere would have done almost as much damage to the dense Mideast popu-
lation. 
 
 But the forgoing scenario would not have occurred. Instead, the threat to Israel and its neigh-
bors would have been so great that Operation Desert Storm against Iraq probably would not have 
been mounted by the United States and other countries. Instead, Saddam Hussein would probably 
have gotten away with his aggression against Kuwait. And if that had happened, Saddam's dementia 
combined with vast oil wealth and a nuclear capability could have altered for the worse the course 
of human history. Israel's preemptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear installation in Osiraq ironically 
benefited Kuwait and Saudi Arabia even more than itself. 
 
 These retrospective and counterfactual speculations make it clear that Israel did the world a 
great service on June 7, 1981, in its air strike against the Osiraq nuclear reactor. But Monday morn-
ing quarterbacking is easy. We ought to take the perspective of 1981 and ask two questions: (1) 
Could the importance of Israel's action have been assessed years before the Persian Gulf War? and 
(2) Was Israel's air strike permissible under international law? 
 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL'S AIR STRIKE 
  
 The importance of Israel's air strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor was contemporaneously 
assessed in two Op-Ed pieces in the Washington Star on June 11th and 15th, 1981, both of which 
were reprinted and cited extensively in Congressional hearings on the incident.FN1 In the first of 
these, Representative Stephen J. Solarz argued that "once the Iraqis actually had nuclear weapons  
[pg260], it would have been too late to do anything about it."FN2 If Israel had not acted, the "acqui-
sition of nuclear weapons by a militant and murderous Baathist regime in Baghdad" would not only 
have endangered the "survival of Israel" but also "the peace and stability of the entire world."FN3 
In the second Op-Ed essay, I argued that Iraq "is currently in violation of international law for its 
war of aggression against Iran and its treatment of Assyrian minorities in northern Iraq." FN4 Iraq, I 
added, was "an unstable state" that has "publicly called for the annihilation of Israel."   FN5 Iraq 
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even stated publicly in September, 1980, when Iranian planes caused minimal bomb damage to its 
nuclear reactor, that the reactor was not intended to be used against Iran but against the "Zionist en-
emy."FN6 
 
 In short, it was not overly difficult at the time to understand the importance to world peace of 
Israel's air strike against the Iraqi reactor. Events since 1981 have only served to underline and rein-
force those early perceptions. 
 
II. ISRAEL'S AIR STRIKE DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
  
 Within two weeks of Israel's air strike the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution which 
"strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the norms of international conduct."FN7 International scholars were nearly unanimous in 
agreeing that Israel had violated international law. My colleagues on the Board of Editors of the 
American Journal of International Law were surprised by my unconventional view expressed in the 
Op-Ed essay and in my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.FN8 To further 
spell out my position, I wrote an editorial for the American Journal,FN9 gave a speech in Canada, 
FN10 and devoted a chapter of a book published in 1987 to the general subject.FN11 (I cite this ad-
ditional work because of a point about fairness in debate that I want to make at the end of this es-
say.) 
 The main legal arguments about the legality or illegality of the Israeli air strike under interna-
tional law can be collected under four headings. Let me summarize them briefly and add some pre-
sent observations.  [pg261] 
 
A. "Anticipatory Self-Defense" 
 
Representative Solarz argued in his Op-Ed essay that Israel's air strike "must be considered an un-
derstandable and legitimate act of self-defense."FN12 My Op-Ed essay in the same newspaper took 
the opposite position: 
  
Such an argument would invoke the same provision [Article 51 of the U.N. Charter] that attor-
neys for the U.S. Department of State used to justify the blockade of Cuba in 1962 during the 
Cuban missile crisis. However, the argument now is no better than it was then. The self-defense 
provision of Article 51 comes into effect only "if an armed attack occurs.' There was no armed 
attack on the U.S. in 1962 anymore than there was on Israel in 1981.FN13 
  
 To be sure, all general legal proscriptions are vague. But vagueness is not the same as meaning-
lessness. "Self-defense" and "anticipatory self-defense" are vague but not vacuous. Unless we want 
to do violence to language, those terms simply cannot apply to Israel's preemptive strike on an Iraqi 
nuclear reactor facility that was not even operational at the time of the strike. 
 
 Yet even now some scholars are invoking the notion of "anticipatory self-defense" to justify Is-
rael's action. In an essay published in this journal, Louis Rene Beres and Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto cor-
rectly define anticipatory self-defense as an entitlement to strike first when the danger posed is "in-
stant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."FN14 In claim-
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ing that this language actually describes Israel's air strike, they only succeed in impairing their own 
credibility. 
 
B. "A State of War" 
  
 Another argument advanced by Representative Solarz at the time of the Israel air strike is the 
following: 
  
Iraq is still in a technical state of war against Israel, never having signed the Armistice Agree-
ment, as did Egypt, Jordan, the Lebanon, and even Syria, in 1949. Indeed, to this day, Iraq still 
has not recognized Israel's right to exist and continues to call for the elimination of the "Zionist 
entity.'FN15 
  
The point is that if a war exists between Iraq and Israel, Israel's bombing of the Osiraq nuclear reac-
tor is just a normal and legitimate part of the general conduct of war. 
 
 My reply to Representative Solarz was that resort to war has been illegal under international 
law since the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928. It [pg262]  follows that a nation cannot derive a 
legal entitlement from an illegal war. Whether or not Israel or Iraq, or both, regarded themselves as 
being in a state of war, any hostilities between them would amount to separate breaches of the peace 
in the eyes of the international community and would subject either country to forcible intercession 
by the U.N. Security Council. 
 
C. The Security Council Resolution 
  
 I have already quoted the U.N. Security Council resolution which "strongly condemn[ed]" Is-
rael's air strike.FN16 But there is less here than meets the eye. In the first place, the Security Coun-
cil is not empowered to create international law; it is not a world legislature. Hence its resolutions 
can only be an expression of the opinion of its members, and not constitutive of international norms. 
Secondly, since the sponsors of the resolutions know that resolutions are not norm-creating, they are 
afforded a diplomatic opportunity to have their cake and eat it too—to condemn something while 
secretly applauding it. The Security Council resolution condemning Israel may have seemed tough 
in its wording, but its importance lies in what it omitted. There was no mention of punishment in the 
resolution. There was no call for reparations to be paid by Israel. There was no call for damages. No 
enforcement machinery under the Charter was set in motion (as it was, for example, ten years later 
in respect of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait). Any informed observer looking at the action of the Security 
Council would have been justified in calling it a gentle pat on the wrist. In actual effect, though not 
in wording, the resolution can only be seen as covert support for Israel's air strike. My guess is that 
the international community, via the resolution, was breathing a collective sigh of relief. 
 
D. Systemic Considerations 
  
 Given the contemporaneous arguments that I made about the Israel air strike—that Israel had 
no "self-defense" justification and no "state of war" entitlement—the present reader may wonder 
what was left that could justify the air strike as permissible under international law. The argument I 
made at the time, and which I continue to believe is valid, is that Israel acted as a proxy for the in-
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ternational community. In short, the justification for Israel's air strike cannot be found in considera-
tions peculiar to Israel, but it can be found in globally inclusive considerations: 
  
International law that has evolved over thousands of years as a system for stabilizing the interac-
tions of states and governments by defining presumptions of legality arising out of the custom-
ary acts of the states themselves. The purpose of international law is to create the precondition 
for peace and human rightsFN17 
  
 In a subsequent expansion of this idea, I included the uniqueness of nuclear weapons as a threat 
to systemic stability:  [pg263]  
  
The destructive potential of nuclear weapons is so enormous as to call into question any and all 
received rules of international law regarding the transboundary use of force. Many of the old ra-
tionales for these rules no longer apply. At the same time, the shared values underlying the rules 
apply more emphatically than ever, for the stake is global survival.FN18 
  
 There are several constraints implicit in the foregoing arguments: 
 
 (1) The preemptive strike has to be against a nuclear weapons facility, and not against any other 
kind of weaponry; 
 (2) The target state must be a rogue state in the sense that it is unstable and is likely to use its 
nuclear weapons for international blackmail and aggrandizement; 
 (3) The preemptive strike must be limited to the nuclear facility target and must be carried out 
with the least possible loss of life; and 
 (4) The international community must be de facto disabled from carrying out the strike itself, 
thus implicitly authorizing an attack state to act as proxy for the international community. 
 
 As I realized subsequent to my writing on the Israeli air strike, the idea of multilateral disability 
for carrying out inclusive objectives resulting in giving a state a unilateral proxy can also apply to 
the quite different area of humanitarian intervention. I argued in the cases of U.S. intervention in 
GranadaFN19 and PanamaFN20 that when fundamental human rights are in jeopardy and the inter-
national community for whatever reason does not take action, a state is authorized to take limited 
military incursion to prevent additional violations of fundamental human rights, provided that the 
attacking state withdraw as soon as possible and makes no attempt to interfere with the territorial 
integrity or political independence of the target state.FN21 I happened to be attending an interna-
tional law conference on the day that the United States sent its troops into Saudi Arabia as a show of 
force against the Iraq army which had just overtaken Kuwait and was threatening to march into 
Saudi Arabia. Many of the conferees were asked about the legality of the unilateral action of the 
United States (this was, of course, months before the actual launching of Operation Desert Storm). 
My brief comment, perhaps because it seemed pithy, was picked up and aired on CNN's Headline 
News every twenty minutes for the next twenty-four hours. I said that "multilateral action is better 
than unilateral action, but unilateral action is better than no action at all." This fairly sums up my 
position not only with respect to the Kuwait invasion, but also as to Grenada, Panama, and the Is-
raeli strike against the Osiraq reactor.[pg264]  
 Although my international law colleagues may not agree with my general position on these 
matters, it is a source of comfort to me that many of them have recently acknowledged that I was 
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right in 1981 in defending the legality of Israel's air strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor. It is 
clear, they say, that if Saddam Hussein had had a nuclear capability at the time of his invasion of 
Kuwait, the consequences would have been unimaginably terrifying for global peace. 
 
3. Fairness in Academic Debate 
  
 As I have already mentioned, Professor Louis Rene Beres and Colonel Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto 
have contributed an essay on the Israeli air strike in a recent issue of this Journal.FN22 I appreciate 
the new details on the raid itself that they have provided. However, they strive to create the impres-
sion that their arguments are new. They call for a reconsideration of Israel's legal position. They 
proceed to argue the issues of anticipatory self-defense and state of war that I have presented above, 
all along implying that these arguments are now being made for the first time. Their lengthy foot-
notes create the appearance that their research has been thorough and exhaustive. 
 
 Nowhere do they mention that their arguments have been previously ventilated. Nowhere do 
they cite my work nor even take up without attribution the merits of my replies to the arguments 
about self-defense and state of war. Any reader who is new to the debate about the Israeli air strike 
is therefore not told that the arguments of Professor Beres and Colonel Tsiddon-Chatto are unorigi-
nal and have been challenged in the past. If these authors had felt constrained by the standards of 
fair scholarly debate, their essay might have been improved; they might have been inspired to re-
spond to existing arguments. Instead, for reasons of their own, they chose to repackage old goods 
and pass them off as new. In my opinion, the dialectics of scholarship can only work over time to 
approach the ideal of truth if each scholar gives scrupulous attention and credit to the work of his or 
her predecessors in the debate, fairly summarizes that work, and proceeds to build upon that work 
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